Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
Over the last century, the international community has not adequately responded to humanitarian crises around the globe to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Serious differences in how sovereign governments and the international community viewed multiple recent humanitarian crises resulted in inefficient action, or no action at all to stop atrocities. In 2005, the United Nations codified the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in its World Summit Outcome, stating that sovereign governments have a responsibility to protect their populations from atrocities, and if that government is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community had a responsibility to act to stop the atrocity through diplomatic, humanitarian or other peaceful means, or by force in extreme cases. The concept of Responsibility to Protect has gained rapid international acceptance, to include its addition in the 2010 United States National Security Strategy, but serious questions remain regarding the legitimate application of force when force is deemed necessary. This paper considers the 2011 Libyan rebellion as a case study of the use of force under the auspices of The Responsibility to Protect.
THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
We will come. House by house, room by room. It's over. The issue has been decided, we are coming tonight ... we will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity. Only those who lay down their arms will be spared the vengeance awaiting rats and dogs.
-Colonel Muammar Gaddafi

1
On the same day that Colonel Muammar Gaddafi 2 addressed these words to the rebels in Benghazi, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted UN Resolution 1973. This resolution authorized member nations to take -all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas in the Libyan Jamahiriya,‖ 3 marking the first time military force was sanctioned by the UN under the auspices of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to prevent a mass atrocity.
As the concept of R2P continues to gain approval in the international community, the The 2011 Libyan civil war took place from February to October, providing a set timeframe for analysis. 4 In the footsteps of other North African nations such as Tunisia, Transition Council request for an extension until the end of the year. 20 The second was UNSCR 2017, which addressed concerns over lost accountability of surface-to-air missiles, and continued accountability of chemical weapons. 21 The Transitional Libyan government was sworn in on 24 November. Led by Prime Minister Abdurrahim el-Keib, the transitional government will rule the nation and set conditions for government elections in June of 2012. 22 The challenges the Libyan transitional government face are steep. They must begin by building government institutions that did not exist during Gaddafi's 42-year rule. They are faced with revitalizing the Libyan oil industry and establishing a justice system, whose first task will be to try members of the Gaddafi regime for crimes against humanity. ICISS determined that there are three elements, or responsibilities, with R2P. First is the responsibility to prevent; addressing the core issues in a given situation that are the direct causes that put populations at risk. The second is the responsibility to react; using all means, to include military force if necessary, to respond to situations of compelling human need. The third is the responsibility to re-build; to assist nations, especially after military intervention, in recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation. The priority, according to the ICISS report, is always to prevent, using the least coercive measures first. 30 In addition to establishing these core principles in R2P, the ICISS proposed criteria for the use of force to protect civilians. These included the basic elements of the just war theory; that there must be a clear and serious threat of harm, there must be a
proper purpose for the use of force (to protect civilians), the use of force must be a last resort, proportional means must be used, and there must be a reasonable chance of the military operation being successful. In addition, the ICISS proposed that the -right authority‖ to authorize the use of force (to maintain legitimacy) is the UN Security Additionally, the ICISS stated that the rules of engagement be clear and consistent with the operational concept, that force protection cannot become the principle objective, and that there must be maximum coordination with humanitarian organizations. 31 The publication of the ICISS report on the heels of the September 11 (GPTF) in an attempt to address policy issues associated with preventing mass atrocities. 34 In the U.S., R2P has been integrated into key strategic documents such as the 2010 National Security Strategy, 35 the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 36 and was the subject of a 2011 Presidential Study Directive. 37 As the concept or R2P continues to gain international approval, albeit with many who ardently disagree with it, it is important that the fundamental issues with regard to R2P and its application in Libya be examined to determine the viability of the concept and look at ways to improve policy and procedures for its implementation. With a basic understanding, then, of the events of the 2011 UN intervention in Libya, and an understanding of the concept of R2P, we turn to the issues of legitimacy, the U.S. role in R2P, and military operations.
Legitimacy
The legality and legitimacy of introducing coercive force into a sovereign nation is arguably the most controversial aspect of R2P, and the epicenter of the challenge of the concept. The first responsibility posed by the ICISS is to prevent, 38 which requires that action must be taken before a crime is committed, creating a significant dilemma for the UN and member nations. David Scheffer sums up the dilemma this way.
The most effective enforcement of R2P will normally precede an accurate legal description of the crime at issue, a task that may take years and several criminal trials, or a judgment of the International Court of Justice to establish. Policymakers must make the political decision about whether and how to take action, while gambling on the nature of the crime threatening a civilian population and how, if left unchallenged, that crime may unfold. In some situations, the Security Council can cut through the complexities with adoption of an enforcement resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which mandates an R2P action long before the legal definitional exercise upon which R2P is predicated could be completed with certainty. In other situations, the caution required in determining whether certain actions meet the legal definition of an atrocity crime will prove to be a constructive brake on precipitous or overly ambitious R2P theorizing that otherwise might have launched unwise and unjustified military action. 39 The 2008 GPTF report also weighted prevention as a high priority, although prevention is an elusive goal at best. 40 In an article criticizing the GPTF report, Sarah
Sewell highlighted the challenges of identifying the root issues in a potential genocide, let alone preventing them, stating:
Like counter-terrorism on the -hard‖ side of security, prevention offers a one-size-fits-all banner under which all manner of interests and organizations can gather. Another -crack in the armor‖ of legitimacy was the perception that NATO exceeded the UN mandate of protecting civilians. Critics cited two primary reasons why they believed the mandate was exceeded. The first criticism was that that the U.S. and NATO airstrikes exceeded the mandate by imperiling civilians in Libya with its bombing campaign. 44 The second reason was that U.S. President Obama, British Prime Minister Cameron and French President Sarkozy called for the ouster of the Libyan leader early in the campaign, causing speculation that protection of civilians was a ruse that allowed them to pursue their true end state, regime change. 45 Cornell Law School professor
William Jacobson expressed two main concerns with the perception that NATO, led by the U.S., had exceeded the mandate by seeking a regime change in Libya.
First, whatever purported legitimacy was conveyed by the U.N. Resolution has evaporated. We no longer are enforcing a no-fly zone or protecting civilians; we are engaging in regime change and taking sides in a civil war. We may like the result, but we should not delude ourselves into thinking such result was authorized by the U.N.
Second, we have damaged our ability to obtain U.N. Security Council resolutions in the future, when we actually might have vital national interests at stake. This makes helpful resolutions on Iran more difficult to obtain, as Russia and China will be hesitant to give us an inch in fear we will take a yard. 46 The vague language contained in UNSCR 1973 authorizing member nations to -take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack‖ 47 leaves significant room for interpretation, but does not seem to suggest that regime change was intended. This perceived, if not real, violation of the spirit and letter of UNSCR 1973 presents a significant challenge to future diplomats seeking UN resolutions in support of R2P. When motives are questioned, or when a state is perceived as using the concept of R2P to advance its own national interests and not for the protection of civilians, R2P is found suspect and the ability to act under the auspices of R2P in the future are weakened.
R2P and the United States
Is the concept of R2P executable without the involvement of the United States?
The ICISS suggests that R2P relies on its legitimacy primarily through UN resolutions. 48 The fact that the U.S. contributes 22% of the regular UN budget and 27% of the peacekeeping budget, 49 combined with the fact that it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, gives it an enormous amount of leverage in the UN. Without U.S.
support, it is unlikely that the UN Security Council could pass a resolution regarding R2P. It should also be noted that any of the five permanent members of the UNSC hold veto authority. -And obviously, the Libya operation also made visible that some European allies lack critical capabilities, in particular within intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and air-to-air refueling. And I urge those allies to focus their defense investments in these areas to acquire the needed capabilities.‖ we protect civilians…many in the opposition truly are civilians…trying to protect their civilian businesses, lives and families.‖ 59 Distinguishing the civilians they were charged to protect from armed rebels while in combat against Gaddafi's forces with no contact with the rebels or civilians on the ground was challenging to say the least.
Complicating matters is the fact that there is no specific U.S. policy or U.S.
military doctrine specific to mass atrocity situations, each with its own unique circumstances. While many of the mission sets are relatively standard, regardless of the context, there are elements specific to intervention in a mass atrocity situation that should be taken into consideration. Two notable efforts took place to confront this Operations (MARO), 61 proposes specific military decision making procedures for commanders and staffs faced with planning a military intervention for a mass atrocity.
The report will inform PSD-10, and parts of it will be incorporated into joint military doctrine in the near future. All of these efforts are positive steps toward developing an effective framework at the national and military level in the U.S. to prevent and deal with mass atrocity situations.
Conclusion
The UN intervention in the 2011 Libyan rebellion to protect civilians exposed both the promise and the peril of The Responsibility to Protect. In response to the perceived threat of a mass atrocity, the international community acted through the UN with unprecedented unanimity, speed, and decisiveness. It acted within the framework of the hard won concept of the Responsibility to Protect, codified in the 2005 Summit
Outcome. While one cannot prove a negative, we do know that a large mass atrocity, as threatened by COL Gaddafi, did not occur. We do know that NATO air strikes did affect Gaddafi's forces, and they were unable to execute the systematic house-to-house search for and destruction of rebels that he threatened. Therefore, one could argue that the UN executed a successful intervention in Libya and achieved the goal of protecting civilians from a mass atrocity, thus validating the R2P concept. The intervention in Libya, however, also raised serious concerns about the peril of the concept that will need to be addressed in order for the concept to be valid in the future.
Legitimacy, defined as -conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules or standards‖ 62 is a cornerstone of R2P, and must be maintained. To that end, the UN needs to make adjustments that allow for continuous assessment and adjustment to resolutions as required. The primary factor that caused the legitimacy of the UN intervention in Libya to be compromised was the perception that the U.S. and NATO The U.S. is critical, at least in the near future, to the success of R2P. Due to its influence in the UN and NATO, as well as its military capability, it is unlikely that any sustained offensive military intervention in the future will not require U.S. diplomatic, financial, and military support. The U.S. is already taking steps to organize its approach, codify its thinking, and establish mechanisms to tackle the challenge of mass atrocity situations. In addition to these ongoing actions, the U.S., in conjunction with the UN and other nations, must organize its strategic communication (STRATCOM) plans for these scenarios. Given the complex nature of introducing military forces in and amongst civilians, communication of intent is critical to an operation's success and its legitimacy. In any given mass atrocity situation, transparency to multiple audiences is critical. The U.S. must communicate to its international audience, domestic audience, the offending state or non-state actors, the civilians they are charged with protecting, any rebel forces that may be involved, and the international community. Failure to communicate with all of these audiences will result in misinterpretation of intentions, and potentially compromise the operation and the R2P concept. As always, the U.S. must be aware of the risk that desired messages to one audience can undermine an intended message to another audience. In Libya, for example, the U.S. communicated with its international audience by its actions. Although the U.S. planned, led, and ultimately sustained the offensive operations in Libya, the rapid transition of command of the air campaign to NATO signaled that this was not a U.S. play for domination in the region. With the 2011 Libyan intervention, the concept of The Responsibility to Protect has elevated the consciousness of the international community, and has the potential of preventing some future mass atrocities. If we fail, however, to learn from the mistakes of this undertaking, the concept will not become the norm it was hoped to be, to all of our peril. 4 Due to the recency of the Libyan civil war, there is a lack of historical scholarship that consolidates and independently verifies dates in this conflict. The most significant events, however, have been widely reported in open source news sites, and, when combined with dated documents from the United Nations and other sources provide a level of confidence in their validity sufficient to the purpose of this paper. 23 Ibid., 2. 27 Evans. The Responsibility to Protect, Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. 27-30. the first case was in Somalia. After the 1991 overthrow of President Said Barre, hundreds of thousands of Somalis were displaced, resulting in a massive humanitarian disaster that threatened at least that many lives. The initial UN peacekeeping force, designed to ensure humanitarian aid reached the needy, was enhanced with an eventual 28,000 peacekeepers. An expansion of the UN mission due to 40 Pakistani peacekeepers being killed, led to US forces attempting to capture or kill militia leaders responsible for preventing humanitarian aid reaching the needy. The resulting -Black Hawk Down‖ incident and the loss of 18 U.S. Soldiers precipitated the withdrawal of U.S. forces, quickly followed by the withdrawal of the UN, without achieving its original mission.
The second case was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. After the downing of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana's airplane on April 6 th , widespread violence broke out as the UN Peacekeeping force under Canadian Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire stood by powerless to stop it. He was powerless because the UN failed to change his mandate and specifically ordered him not to intervene, and the UN denied his request for 5000 troops to stem the violence. The Hutu killing of 12 Belgian peacekeepers led to the eventual withdrawal of all UN forces. In the end, over 800,000 Tutsis would be massacred in a four month period.
The third case occurred in Bosnia in 1995. A UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) entered Bosnia with the consent of the former Yugoslavia and other countries for peacekeeping operations. This mission was later expanded to include the protection of aid workers and five safe areas around five Bosnian towns to include Srebrenica. Due to complex and confusing chains of command and authorities, General Ratko Mladic seized the town of Srebrenica under the watch of 400 Dutch peacekeepers, loaded 8,000 men and boys into trucks and took them to various locations for execution.
The final case in the 1990s that would lead to international interest in intervention took place in Kosovo in 1998. Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic began a campaign to crush ethnic Albanian sentiment. The UN and NATO struggled to come up with a solution until, in March 1999, the murder of 45 Kosovo Albanians led the U.S. and NATO to intervene despite the lack of a UN resolution, which China and Russia refused to support. The resulting 78 days of bombing continued while the Serbs killed thousands more Albanians, and forced the displacement of thousands more. The NATO bombing in Kosovo, while not technically legal in international law, was deemed legitimate by the international community due to the moral imperatives they were designed to uphold.
